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Governmentality, Biopower, and the Debate
over Genetic Enhancement
LADELLE McWHORTER
University of Richmond, Richmond, Virginia, USA

Although Foucault adamantly refused to make moral pronouncements or dictate moral principles or political programs to his readers, his work offers a number of tools and concepts that can help us
develop our own ethical views and practices. One of these tools is
genealogical analysis, and one of these concepts is “biopower.” Specifically, this essay seeks to demonstrate that Foucault’s concept of
biopower and his genealogical method are valuable as we consider
moral questions raised by genetic enhancement technologies. First,
it examines contemporary debate over the development, marketing,
and application of such technologies, suggesting that what passes
for ethical deliberation is often little more than political maneuvering in a field where stakes are very high and public perceptions will
play a crucial role in decisions about which technologies will be
funded or disallowed. It goes on to argue that genuine ethical deliberation on these issues requires some serious investigation of
their historical context. Accordingly, then, it takes up the oft-heard
charge from critics that genetic enhancement technologies are
continuous with twentieth-century eugenic projects or will usher in
a new age of eugenics. Foucault explicitly links twentieth-century
eugenics with the rise of biopower. Through review of some aspects
of the twentieth-century eugenics movement alongside some of the
rhetoric and claims of enhancement’s modern-day proponents, the
essay shows ways in which deployment of genetic enhancement
technologies is and is not continuous with earlier deployments of
biopower.
Keywords: biopower, eugenics, Foucault, genetic enhancement,
governmentality
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I. INTRODUCTION
Michel Foucault made no claims about the moral rightness or wrongness of
altering human genomes or the human gene pool, but that silence does not
bespeak a lack of knowledge of or interest in the science of genetics or its applications. Through his research for Birth of the Clinic and The Order of Things,
Foucault was well versed in the history of both medicine and biology. As part
of his candidacy presentation for his position at the Collège de France, he
proposed a course on the knowledge of heredity in the nineteenth century
“starting from breeding techniques, on through attempts to improve species,
experiments with intensive cultivation, efforts to combat animal and plant epidemics, and culminating in the establishment of a genetics whose birth date
can be placed at the beginning of the twentieth century” (Foucault, 1997b, 7).
As the course description goes on to make clear, what captured Foucault’s
interest was this early knowledge’s rise to epistemic credibility, its ascent toward the status of truth, not its ethical entanglements and implications. But he
cannot have been oblivious to them, especially as he turned his attention over
the next 8 or 9 years to disciplinary normalization and then to sexuality and
biopower. His reticence was not a product of ignorance or neglect but of his
own ethical principles. Foucault repeatedly refused to set an ethical agenda for
anyone but himself. “People have to build their own ethics,” he declared
(Foucault, 1997a, 132). Intellectuals and experts may provide information and
analyses that serve as resources or “toolkits” for that project, but ultimately
people have to exercise their freedom in the creation of their own ethoi.
It might seem odd, then, to examine the current debate over the morality of
genetic enhancement from a Foucaultian perspective. Certainly any attempt to
enter the discussion using Foucault’s work as a foundation for making moral
claims would be futile. But that is not the aim here. Instead, I intend to show,
first, that what passes for ethical deliberation in the philosophical, bioethical,
and scientific literature is for the most part not that; it is, rather, a verbal political
struggle among sets of people, most of whom have already made up their
minds on the ethical issues, who are attempting to position themselves to influence governmental decisions about scientific and medical practices. Second, I
will use some of the genealogical tools that Foucault developed in his work on
sexuality, biopower, and governmentality to situate this political struggle in a
larger historical and political context, which I hope, in keeping with the spirit
of Foucault’s work, may be of some service in projects of ethical creativity.
II. FIRST, THE POLITICS OF DEBATE
The debate over genetic enhancement purports to be a deliberation about
whether one should act in certain ways, such as (1) support (or, in the case
of scientists, engage in) genetic research leading to the development of

Governmentality, Biopower, and Genetic Enhancement

411

enhancement technology (and if one is a clinician whether one should then
facilitate its application), (2) vote for candidates for public office who would
in turn vote for government funding for such research and technological
development or at least refuse to ban it, and, perhaps, (3) offer oneself or
one’s progeny as test subjects. However, deliberation implies consideration
of others’ views, feelings, and worries, something notably missing from most
writing on this subject. Instead of attempting to understand their interlocutors’ concerns, parties to the debate typically engage those with varying
perspectives not as partners in deliberation but as adversaries to be countered or, even, as oppressors to be denounced and resisted.
“What I fail to understand is how other people—or the federal
government—could think it is just to prevent me from benefiting my future
children,” says University of Alabama at Birmingham School of Medicine
professor Gregory Pence. “I see no difference between such a ban and a
similar ban on parents sending their children to computer camps in the summer: both are intended to better children, both will be done most by people
with money, and both are not the business of government” (Stock and
Campbell, 2000, 113). Government interference with parental decisions to
alter their embryos’ genomes is a form of tyranny, Pence implies, and people
who want the government to ban enhancement are would-be tyrants. Pence
is not the only proponent of enhancement to see the situation that way. Bioethicist John Harris asserts that “the key idea of reproductive liberty is surely
respect for autonomy and for the values which underlie the importance attached to procreation. These values see procreation and founding a family
as involving the freedom to choose one’s own lifestyle and express, through
actions as well as through words, the deeply held beliefs and the morality
which families share and seek to pass on to future generations” (Harris,
2007, 76). Unless we can demonstrate that great harm will result from parents opting to have their embryos genetically enhanced, Harris maintains,
we cannot legitimately prevent their doing so. He insists, further, that all
predictions of great harm are faulty or false. Therefore, those who seek to
prohibit genetic enhancement pose a serious threat to political liberty.
The right to privacy in reproductive and family matters is not the only
principle at stake, according to many advocates of enhancement; the First
Amendment’s guarantee of religious freedom is also in jeopardy. Many dismiss their opponents’ ethical arguments out of hand with the claim that their
views are based (ultimately if not always obviously) on religious belief—in
other words that, in violation of the Constitution, opponents of genetic enhancement seek to impose their religion the rest of us.1 Geneticist James
Watson, codiscoverer of DNA’s double helical structure and cofounder of the
Human Genome Project, asserts that, if we can safely enhance people’s intelligence, “we’ve got to go ahead and not worry whether we’re going to offend
some fundamentalist from Tulsa, Oklahoma” (Stock and Campbell, 2000, 80),
presumably a reference to televangelist Oral Roberts and, by extension, the
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right-wing political forces that have opposed abortion, in vitro fertilization,
stem cell research, and numerous other medical and biological initiatives on
religious grounds. Similarly, University of Connecticut School of Medicine
professor James Hughes condemns opposition to genetic enhancement as
nothing but “Luddite mysticism,” by which he seems to mean a combination
of irrational fear of technology and improper importation of religious tenets
into the secular political realm (Stock and Campbell, 2000, 130). Whenever
metaphysically inspired legal limits are placed on biological research and
technological application, these and many other scientists and medical practitioners believe that injustice is being done. Their writings are attempts to
expose that injustice and counter it—a project that leaves little room for seriously entertaining the concerns their opponents express.
Proponents of the freedom to enhance are not the only ones making
charges of injustice, however. Many opponents of genetic engineering
express fear that enhancement amounts to a resurgence of eugenics, a
twentieth-century political movement that resulted in the incarceration and
forced sterilization of tens of thousands of Americans, most of whom were
poor and many of whom were recent immigrants or members of racial or
ethnic minorities. In an article entitled “State-sponsored liberal eugenics has
just begun,” for example, C. Ben Mitchell and C. Christopher Hook (fellows
of the Institute of Biotechnology and the Human Future) warn that “so-called
enhancement is merely a desire to re-engineer the human person” (Mitchell
and Hook, 2006), an assertion reinforced by proclamations from avowed
eugenicists such as Glayde Whitney (whose work is underwritten by the
infamous Pioneer Fund founded by twentieth-century scientific racist Wickliffe
Draper2): “The first century or two of the new millennium will almost certainly be a golden age for eugenics. Through application of new genetic
knowledge and reproductive technologies the Galtonian Revolution will
come to fruition” (Whitney, 1999, 179). Appalled by such prospects, Mitchell
and Hook (2006) go on to ask, “Have we learned none of the lessons of the
older eugenic age? … How many will have to die in human re-design experiments …? Moreover, through genetic enhancement, we will inevitably create
at least two genetic classes of people: the gene-enhanced and the rest of us.
We have not even figured out how to solve access to healthcare for therapeutic and preventive goals. Injustice already abounds in our society. How
do we hope even to begin a discussion about equal access to genetic modification for enhancement purposes?”. In an essay entitled “Is a New Eugenics
Afoot?” historian of science Allen Garland voices similar concerns:
The early 20th-century eugenics movement was a product of a particular economic,
social, and scientific context: a highly transitional period in American economic
and industrial expansion, the advent of a new genetic paradigm, and the ideology
of rational management by scientifically trained experts. As historian Sheila Weiss
has emphasized, there was enough logic to the eugenic argument—saving the
hard-pressed taxpayer the burden of supporting masses of supposedly defective
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people—to give it popular appeal. For a segment of the biological community,
it provided career opportunities that could be justified as the application of their
science directly to the solution of social problems. For the wealthy benefactors
that supported eugenics, such as the Carnegie, Rockefeller, Harriman, and Kellogg
philanthropies, eugenics provided a means of social control in a period of unprecedented upheaval and violence. […]
I would argue that we are poised at the threshold of a similar period in our own
history and are adopting a similar mind frame as our predecessors. […]
We seem to be increasingly unwilling to accept what we view as imperfection in
ourselves and others. As health care costs skyrocket, we are coming to accept a
bottom-line, cost-benefit analysis of human life. This mindset has serious implications for reproductive decisions. […] If eugenics means making reproductive decisions primarily on the basis of social cost, then we are well on that road (Garland,
2001, 61).

For many opponents of genetic enhancement, this discussion is not so
much a moral deliberation as a political struggle against forces that they believe would compound economic inequality and oppression.
Regardless of which side one takes on these issues, it is clear that much is
at stake—professional careers, billions of dollars in funding for research and
potential profits, and millions of human (and not only human) lives. Perhaps, for many people something even more precious is at stake as well:
their dreams, their visions, and their worldviews. Most participants in the
debate seem to believe that something very crucial is about to be decided,
something that once decided cannot be reversed, something far more than a
course of research or a set of public policies, and something that will transform all of us, genetically or not. That may be one reason why there is a
distinct streak of nastiness running through this literature, why it includes so
many personal attacks3 and denunciations, so much name-calling and incredulity in the face of others’ concerns. This debate is a highly sensitive nodal
point in an event that Foucault might call an emerging problematization. The
issues it encompasses are likely to become more rather than less pressing in
the near future, impinging upon our lives in a variety of ways. Thus, the
controversy over genetic enhancement technologies demands some careful
attention.
III. BUT IS IT REALLY EUGENICS?
Foucault often began his analyses of problematizations at the points within
discourses where tensions seem to concentrate. One of those points in the
enhancement controversy is the oft-repeated allegation that genetic enhancement amounts to or will usher in a new eugenics movement, a development
that most parties to this discussion take to be undeniably bad or even horrific.
Proponents of enhancement work hard to distinguish it from eugenics and to
establish a stark moral contrast between the twentieth-century movement and
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genetic technologies in the present day. Gregory Pence, for example, says
he simply supports allowing parents as wide a range of reproductive choices
as technologically possible. “This is not state-controlled eugenics (which attempted to take away such choices from parents), but its opposite,” he insists. “If a child can be given an extra decade of life by an artificial chromosome,
or 50 percent more memory through a therapy in utero, then I personally
would feel obligated to give my future child such benefits” (Stock and
Campbell, 2000, 113).
Although Pence’s sense of obligation is not widely shared, his strategy for
differentiating his view from eugenics is. In a survey of British professionals,
Kerr, Cunningham-Burley, and Amos (1998) found five strategies, which they
refer to as “rhetorical boundaries,” that genetic researchers and clinicians use
to distinguish their practices from eugenics: (1) Eugenics was pseudoscience. (2) The kinds of eugenic human engineering that lay people fear are
not technically feasible or realistic; scientists cannot really design and produce people from scratch. (3) Eugenics involved coercive reproductive policies in totalitarian regimes, whereas contemporary selection decisions are
made by private individuals and families. (4) Even in the eugenic past, geneticists were not at fault; their work was simply appropriated and abused
by eugenicists. And (5) eugenic policies of the past focused on altering the
human gene pool or some nationally or racially defined subset thereof,
whereas the focus of human genetics now is on addressing individuals’ conditions. Although those interviewed in the Kerr study were not necessarily
advocates for genetic alteration beyond therapeutic intervention, variations
on the rhetorical strategies they use recur in the enhancement literature.4
Enhancement advocates typically emphasize individual freedom of choice as
opposed to state coercion and the absence of nationalistic or racist goals as
the impetus for germ-line improvement. Genetic enhancement is not eugenics, most advocates claim, as long as alteration is voluntary and the aim is
not the creation of a master race. Eugenics is not part of genetic enhancement’s agenda or genealogy.
Critics are not pacified by these assertions. They counter that such arguments misrepresent either the twentieth-century eugenics movement or the
twenty-first-century technological and political situation, or both; the two are
not nearly as dissimilar as proponents of enhancement would have us think.
In fact, many twentieth-century advocates of eugenics were practicing scientists, and some (including Joshua Lederberg, Francis Crick, Edward Tatum,
and Theodosius Dobzhansky5) were practicing geneticists. Eugenics and genetics overlapped significantly from the 1910s well into the 1930s and to
some extent even into the 1950s and 1960s; it is simply false to dismiss eugenics as a pseudoscientific movement. Furthermore, the aims of eugenic
policies and programs were multiple and included relieving suffering and
reducing taxes; they were not exclusively focused on racist ascendency. Eugenics was widely accepted and implemented not only in totalitarian states
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such as Nazi Germany but also in liberal democracies such as the United
States and Great Britain. Nor is it the case, as Kerr et al. (1998, 193) point out,
that twenty-first-century genetics practitioners focus exclusively on alteration
of the individual rather than of the human gene pool and the course of
human evolution.
It is true that race plays a much smaller role in this new technological
movement than it did in the old eugenics movement. In the past, there were
some prominent groups that called for extermination of entire races of people. But it is not true that the old movement was all about race. In fact, its
central focus was not races but rather classes of people whose physical or
behavioral characteristics made them “unfit” for modern life or “socially inadequate.” Extremists wanted to bring about extermination of these people’s
germ lines through “euthanasia,”6 but the vast majority of eugenics’ adherents favored nonlethal means. In 1922, Cold Spring Harbor’s Eugenics Record Office director Harry Laughlin drafted a Model Eugenical Sterilization
Law—“an act to prevent the procreation of persons socially inadequate from
defective inheritance”—wherein a “socially inadequate person” was defined
as “one who by his or her own effort, regardless of etiology or prognosis,
fails chronically in comparison to normal persons, to maintain himself or
herself as a useful member of the organized social life of the state.” Socially
inadequate classes of people included:
(1) Feeble-minded; (2) Insane, (including the psychopathic); (3) Criminalistic (including the delinquent and wayward); (4) Epileptic; (5) Inebriate (including drug-habitués);
(6) Diseased (including the tuberculous, the syphilitic, the leprous, and others with
chronic, infectious and legally segregable diseases); (7) Blind (including those with
seriously impaired vision); (8) Deaf (including those with seriously impaired hearing); (9) Deformed (including the crippled); and (10) Dependent (including orphans,
ne’er-do-wells, the homeless, tramps and paupers) (Laughlin, 1922, 446–7).

Nowhere does the model law mention race. But it is worth noting that in
the aftermath of military IQ testing during World War I, it was commonly
held that close to 90% of African Americans were feeble minded, and published studies of immigrants tested at Ellis Island suggested that the majority
of Southern and Eastern Europeans were moronic if not imbecilic. Also of
note is the fact that homosexuality in both men and women was officially
defined as a form of psychopathic delusion. If completely enacted and enforced, therefore, Laughlin’s model law would have sterilized all lesbians,
gay men, and bisexuals (a measure which may or may not have had any effect on the number of homosexuals in subsequent generations) and would
have eliminated most of the African American population within a few decades, along with many of the newer American immigrant groups such as
Italians, Russians, Poles, and Croatians who were thought to suffer disproportionately not only from feeblemindedness but also from alcoholism and
insanity. Laughlin’s model served as a guide for the men who drafted state
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sterilization laws in the 1920s and 1930s, as well as those who designed the
eugenic sterilization program in Nazi Germany.7 Despite the absence of racial categories in the law, there is no question that heterosexism, racism,
anti-Semitism, and a generalized xenophobia and ethnocentrism permeated
much of the old eugenics movement.
Still, even if application and enforcement of this and similar laws and policies were racist, ethnocentric, and homophobic, the arguments advanced to
justify eugenic sterilization and other reproductive restrictions were seldom
so. As already noted, proponents emphasized the economic savings that
reduction in “dependent” populations would bring, a major selling point for
legislators and taxpayers. And they argued for the evolutionary importance
of offsetting the humane but unnatural consequences of modern medicine,
which enabled people who otherwise would have died of their genetic
weaknesses to live beyond puberty. “Until medical science improved social,
public health and sanitary conditions, nature’s survival of the fittest defended
the human race against the dangers of degeneracy,” declared William Partlow, superintendent of Alabama’s state home for the mentally retarded, in
1936; however, now that “the weak are preserved as well as the strong, if
we are to continue as a virile, upstanding race in body and mind, eugenics
demands its share of study and attention …” (Partlow, 1936, 12). By midcentury, American Eugenics Society president Frederick Osborn warned that
a 97% rate of survival to the thirtieth year, which allowed almost everyone to
live long enough to reproduce, could have devastating consequences. “This
is more than relaxed selection,” he emphasized. “It represents a drastic diminishing in the rate of natural selection, tragic because it points to an increase in the proportion of people born to much suffering” (Osborn, 1968,
70). The only way to prevent devolution was eugenics.
But to characterize twentieth-century eugenics as nothing more than a
means of heading off economic and biological disaster is to do a great injustice to its proponents’ vision. Once free of responsibility to provide for people unable to provide for themselves, the healthier and more intelligent
members of the species would have more children. As a result, the standard
measure of normality would be revised upward. If the bottom 10% of each
generation were sterilized or otherwise prevented from procreating—as officials such as Harry Laughlin advocated8—over time, humanity would evolve
into a far more intelligent, moral, disease-resistant, strong, productive, beautiful species. “We possess the power if we will, deliberately and consciously
to create a new race, to mould the world of the future,” Havelock Ellis wrote
in 1911. With careful control over reproduction, one day the human race as
a whole could be stronger, healthier, more intelligent, more talented, and of
better moral and civic character than even the most successful and wellrespected individuals presently alive. That was the eugenic vision of the
Progressive Era. Racism infected it just as racism infects any ideology in a
racist society; but racism was no more fundamental to it than it was to any
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other social movement or institution in the twentieth century. By and large,
twentieth-century eugenicists simply wanted the best possible future for their
descendants.
They knew there were great technical difficulties to be overcome. Well
before the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Virginia’s eugenic sterilization law
(Buck v Bell, 1927), geneticists were pointing out that ridding the breeding
population of people who express an undesirable trait does not eliminate
the undesirable gene. Many traits are “recessive,” so there are many more
“carriers” than individuals who are actually afflicted. In 1917, R. C. Punnett,
a professor of genetics at Cambridge University, published results of a statistical analysis based on the Hardy-Weinberg Principle which showed that
even if 100% of genetically feeble-minded people were prevented from procreating, it would take 684 generations to reduce the number of carriers to
one in a million individuals. “Clearly,” he wrote, “if that most desirable goal
of a world rid of the feebleminded is to be reached in a reasonable time some
method other than that of the elimination of the feeble-minded themselves
must eventually be found. The great strength of this defect in the population
lies in its heterozygotic reserves; if the campaign against it is to meet with
success it is at these that it must be directed” (Punnett, 1917, 465). Tests
would have to be developed to identify carriers of all traits held to be “dysgenic” and measures put in place to eliminate those individuals, too, from the
breeding population. Sterilization of people committed to state institutions for
the mentally retarded or mentally ill could be mandated through legislation
and court cases, but tracking down phenotypically normal carriers and preventing them from engaging in procreative sex were a far more delicate matter, and state intervention was perhaps not the best or most effective means.
German eugenicists had invented marriage counseling in the 1910s as a
way of influencing reproductive behavior in the general population. North
American eugenicists were somewhat slow to take up the concept, but in
1930 the first marriage counseling center in the United States opened in Altadena, California, with eugenicist Paul Popenoe as its energetic and dedicated director. Funded through the Human Betterment Foundation by Ezra
Gosney (co-author with Popenoe of the eugenic tract Sterilization for
Human Betterment), the American Institute for Family Relations (AIFR) announced at its opening that it would “disseminate eugenics information and
endeavor to aid persons contemplating marriage to make a success of their
venture” (Ladd-Taylor, 2001, 311). In addition to dozens of informational
publications, the AIFR offered premarital counseling (complete with physical
examinations, personality inventories, and marital aptitude tests) emphasizing hereditary fitness and compatibility, advice for couples having difficulties, and training workshops for clergy, teachers, and other professionals
who were themselves engaged in couples counseling. The primary goals
were to convince “unfit” couples to refrain from procreating and to keep “fit”
couples together so that they could procreate more.
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Popenoe’s pioneering efforts in marriage counseling (including his work
with the AIFR as well as his many years as editor of Marriage and Family
Living, his two books Modern Marriage: A Handbook (1925) and Sex, Love,
and Marriage (1963), his television talk show where Los Angeles couples
could air their problems and receive his advice, and his long-running column in the Ladies’ Home Journal entitled “Can This Marriage Be Saved?”)
were clearly recognized by his fellow eugenicists as an important contribution to their cause. Laws and governmental policies might restrain the reproductive behavior of some of the “worst” sorts of people, but heavy-handed
measures would never operate effectively to insure reproduction among the
“best.” No democratic government could compel bright young men and
women to marry and bear children. Incentives could be put in place—tax
breaks, low-interest home loans, and the like—and bachelorhood could be
made economically disadvantageous for middle-class men whereas employment and higher education could be made unattractive for middle-class
women. But achievement of the eugenics movement’s positive goals would
require the willing cooperation of individuals and families, and all the eugenicists of the early and mid-twentieth century knew that. The theories and
institutions they built helped to create and perpetuate a society in which
desire for genetically “superior” offspring would be the norm and in which
tolerance for any sort of biological or behavioral deviation was very low, a
society in which ordinary individuals could be counted on to make eugenic
choices without any official compulsion. As Lee R. Dice, director of the University of Michigan’s Institute of Human Biology, put it, “If there is known to
be a high probability of transmitting a serious defect, it would be an abnormal person indeed who would not refrain from having children” (Dice, 1952,
2). Thus, in pursuit of eugenic social goals, was born the field that in 1947
geneticist Sheldon Reed dubbed “genetic counseling.”9
The birth preceded the christening by about 6 years. In 1941, Charles Fremont Dight’s estate had conferred a substantial sum of money on the University of Minnesota which, according to his will, would “maintain a place
for consultation and advice on heredity and eugenics and for rating of people, first, as to the efficiency of their bodily structure; second, as to their
mentality; third as to their fitness to marry and reproduce” (Paul, 1995, 123).10
In early 1948, soon after Reed gave the new field its name, the Eugenics
Record Office (having been renamed the Genetics Record Office in 1939)
transferred most of the data Harry Laughlin and his staff had compiled to the
Dight Institute, which by then was also supported by money from the estate
of Charles M. Goethe, a financier who devoted much of his life to eugenic
work and served as president of the Eugenics Research Association in 1936
(Black, 2003, 315). The institute ran both a marriage counseling center and
the first genetics counseling center. Its director, Clarence P. Oliver, held that
“a geneticist should prevail upon some persons to have at least their share
of children as well as show a black picture to those with the potentiality of
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producing children with undesirable traits” (Paul, 1995, 126). Oliver left in
1946 for at the University of Texas at Austin, where he continued his work
in genetic counseling (Dice, 1952, 10). His successor was Sheldon Reed,
who presided over Dight’s acquisition of Eugenics Record Office materials.
Reed took a less directive approach, asserting that “the decision must be a
personal one between the husband and wife, and theirs alone” (Paul, 1995,
127). But like Lee Dice, his counterpart at the University of Michigan, Reed
firmly believed that, provided with sound genetic information, individuals
would make eugenic choices without pressure from experts. In 1952 he wrote,
“If our observation is generally correct, that people of normal mentality, who
thoroughly understand the genetics of their problems, will behave in the
way that seems correct to society as a whole, then an important corollary
follows. It could be stated as a principle that the mentally sound will voluntarily carry out a eugenics program which is acceptable to society if counseling
in genetics is available to them” (Paul, 1995, 128). Government need not
impose eugenics programs on normal people. The ubiquitous pressures of
modern life will steer them away from deviance and abnormality in their
reproductive decisions.
Dice (1952, 12) went on to list conditions he considered serious enough
to warrant deciding not to reproduce and to argue for state funding to establish clinics for the purpose of advising couples and assisting with family
planning: “Defective heredity which results in the production of serious
handicaps, such as idiocy, blindness, deafness, dwarfism, muscular atrophy,
anemia, hemophilia, or the tendency to other serious disease is not only a
calamity for the families concerned, but constitutes a serious drain on the
resources of the community”. The state should fund physician training in
genetics and establish free clinics to supply families with good information
and good technologies, he argued, and then families will make the right—
that is, the eugenic—decision.
Obviously, the authority of the physician or geneticist would carry a lot of
weight with any couple who sought reproductive advice, and obviously the
type of training the physician or geneticist received and the information
available through research funded by corporations and government agencies
would set the terms under which any individual or couple would be making
these decisions about whether to conceive or carry a pregnancy to term.11
Prospective parents would have to rely to a great extent on the judgment of
those authorities. If the authorities believed the birth of a deaf child or a
“dwarf” would be a family tragedy, no doubt many families would come to
believe so as well. Eugenicists like Lee Dice certainly knew that. In fact, they
were counting on it.
These changes in tactics, which were in part responses to international
exposure and condemnation of Hitler’s eugenic program, eventually resulted
in a generalized expunging of the word eugenics from popular discourse,
except as a term of condemnation. Eugenicists began to call themselves
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population scientists and human geneticists (Kuhl, 1994, 105; Bruinius, 2006,
317). Gradually, the word disappeared even from the organizations founded
to further the movement’s programs. In 1954, the British Annals of Eugenics
renamed itself Annals of Human Genetics. In 1969, the Eugenics Quarterly
became the Journal of Social Biology. In 1972, the American Eugenics
Society changed its name to the Society for the Study of Social Biology.
Long-time American Eugenics Society President Frederick Osborn told an
interviewer in 1977 that “it became evident that changes of a eugenic nature
would be made for reasons other than eugenics, and … tying a eugenic label
on them would more often hinder than help their adoption. ” 12 But, as
Osborn implies, the vision of a humanity purged of genetic defect and evolving toward a “higher” state persisted. By the end of the twentieth century,
sociologist Dorothy Nelkin and historian Susan Lindee observed,
Eugenics in contemporary culture is less a state ideology than a set of ideals about
a perfected and “healthy” human future. Commonly held beliefs about the powers
of the gene and the importance of heredity facilitate eugenic practices even in the
absence of direct political control of reproduction, for eugenics is not simply gross
coercion of individuals by the state …. Rather, it can be productively understood as
a constellation of beliefs about the importance of genetics in shaping human health
and behavior, the nature of worthwhile life, the interests of society, and, especially,
the meaning of reproductive responsibility. These beliefs—conveyed through the
stories told by popular culture—draw on the assumption that our social, political,
and economic future will depend on controlling the genetic constitution of the
species—the so-called human gene pool (Nelkin and Lindee, 1995, 191).

Whether they are aware of the fact or not, contemporary advocates of human genetic engineering share both the goals and the rhetoric of many of
the twentieth century’s most ardent avowed eugenicists. Knowingly or not,
James Watson echoed Harry Laughlin when he told the London Times in
2003, “If you are really stupid, I would call that a disease …. The lower
10 per cent who really have difficulty, even in elementary school, what’s
the cause of that? A lot of people would like to say, ‘Well, poverty, things
like that.’ It probably isn’t. So I’d like to get rid of that, to help the lower
10 per cent” (Bhattacharya, 2003). The means might differ as technology
permits, but the goal is the same: to eliminate what Laughlin called “feeblemindedness” or “social inadequacy” and what Watson called “stupidity” from
the human gene pool. Likewise, Gregory Pence sounds a great deal like Lee
Dice when he declares, “Although disability advocates insist that there is
nothing wrong with being deaf, a dwarf, or having Down’s syndrome, no
reasonable parent would choose to have a child with such a condition when
he or she could have a normal child. Indeed, in my opinion, it might be immoral to choose to have such a child if one could otherwise have a normal
child” (Stock and Campbell, 2000, 112). The idea that “evolution, as it has
operated in the past, has essentially stopped for the human species,” as
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Gregory Stock of UCLA’s School of Medicine has declared (Stock and
Campbell, 2000, 93), corresponds directly to the views of the eugenicists
such as William Partlow and Frederick Osborn, and, as in their writings, it
serves as a cornerstone of Stock’s and others’ calls for technical management
of human reproduction. In fact, says University of Washington biologist Leroy
Hood, genetic technology is an improvement over natural selection. “We’re
using exactly the same kinds of techniques used by evolution, but what
we’re attempting to do, in a thoughtful and rational way, is to facilitate evolution, so it doesn’t operate in a blind fashion—most of the changes being
neutral or deleterious—but in an optimizing fashion” (Stock and Campbell,
2000, 92). His statement echoes that of eugenicist P. W. Whiting: “Eugenics
is the study of those agencies under social control which may improve or
impair the racial qualities of humanity either physically or mentally. And in
its application it is essentially the intelligent control of human evolution”
(Whiting, 1925, 165). The parallels and echoes are striking.
Watson, Pence, Stock, and Hood do not use the term “eugenics” for what
they advocate (although Watson does not hesitate to acknowledge that he is
“going for perfection” (Abraham, 2002, A1)), but some proponents of germline engineering bite the bullet and embrace the term. In Liberal Eugenics:
In Defence of Human Enhancement, Nicholas Agar writes, “Hitler and
GATTACA [a science fiction movie] have made eugenics an unpopular idea.
However, being unpopular is not the same as being wrong” (Agar, 2004, vii).
And John Harris (2000, 95) happily accepts the label: “I don’t disagree with
people who argue that gene therapy to remove a disability is a form of
eugenics, I specifically adopt the Oxford English Dictionary definition of
eugenics as ‘pertaining … to the production of fine offspring’ and say if this
is what eugenics is everyone should favour eugenics”. Instead of shying
away from the word, these writers challenge their readers to consider the
questions: What, if anything, is wrong with eugenics? What is wrong with
attempting to manage and control human evolutionary development?
IV. LIFE ENTERS HISTORY: A BIOPOLITICAL ANALYSIS
If the current debate is a political struggle rather than an ethical deliberation,
as I have argued above, that challenge is best deferred. Instead, it would be
more prudent to step back from the fray and the dichotomous choices it
tends to offer us and examine the epistemic, material, and historical context
in which “eugenics” carries such a powerful charge. Here is where Foucault’s genealogical tools and concepts become especially valuable.
Foucault discusses eugenics explicitly in Part IV of The History of Sexuality,
Volume 1. Eugenics was one of “the two great innovations in the technology
of sex of the second half of the nineteenth century,” he writes, the other being “the medicine of perversions.” The study of heredity and the analyses it
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produced placed “sex (sexual relations, venereal diseases, matrimonial alliances, perversions) in a position of ‘biological responsibility’ with regard to
the species …. [I]t appeared to be the source of an entire capital for the species to draw from. Whence the medical—but also political—project for organizing a state management of marriages, births, and life expectancies; sex
and its fertility had to be administered” (1978, 118). Meanwhile, the medicine
of perversions made it clear that “not only could sex be affected by its own
diseases, it could also, if it was not controlled, transmit diseases or create
others that would afflict future generations” (1978, 118). The very close alliance between North American and British eugenicists on the one hand and
sexologists on the other makes perfect sense when we look at eugenics and
sexology as merging technologies in the dispositif de sexualité. The dispositif
de sexualité itself must be situated, however, within the dynamic configuration of force relations that Foucault (1978, 140) names “biopower”, which in
turn must be situated within the problematic of what he calls “governmentality” (Foucault, 2007, 108).
The definition of “governmentality” varies in Foucault’s writings. In a 1984
interview, he defined it very broadly: “I intend this concept of ‘governmentality’ to cover the whole range of practices that constitute, define, organize,
and instrumentalize the strategies that individuals in their freedom can use
in dealing with each other” (Foucault, 1997c, 300). Taken in this sense, we
would have to say that all societies have had techniques and practices of
governmentality, different though they may have been. When he first introduced the word (in his 1978 lecture course), however, he offered a more
historically bound definition, restricting the word to a set of procedures,
analyses and knowledges, techniques, and institutions that developed in
Western Europe after the fifteenth century (see 2007, 108–109). Given the
parameters of our historical scope here, either definition will suffice.
In that lecture course—now translated and published under the title
Security, Territory, Population—Foucault notes a shift in the problematic of
large-scale government in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. As feudalism
declined, market towns appeared, wherein people amassed and goods
circulated. This phenomenon created some new governmental concerns. On
the one hand, towns were to be encouraged because they provided a sovereign with means to acquire new wealth. On the other hand, masses of
townspeople were more apt than scattered serfs to revolt, particularly if food
became scarce, and they were also more apt to suffer from plagues and die
suddenly in unprofitably large numbers. Towns, then, were sites of danger.
For the sovereign to be strong, towns had to thrive, but those towns had to
be governed to offset the risks they harbored. So people began to reflect on
the practice of government and develop new techniques—which Foucault
calls techniques of security—until, by the end of the eighteenth century or
the beginning of the nineteenth, a whole new configuration of power relations began to emerge. Though the periodization and terminology are a bit
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loose in Foucault’s work and need to remain so to prevent their reification,
we can call this new configuration of power relations, this new form of governmentality, “biopower.”
Biopower actually grows out of two initially separate efforts, Foucault
(1978, 140) says: “the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations”.
Efforts to subjugate bodies—particularly bodies found in relatively large
numbers within institutional structures where some type of production was
the aim—took the form of disciplinary practices. In Discipline and Punish
(1975), Foucault tells the story of how early modern disciplinary techniques
developed as monastic ascetic practices migrated to the secular domains of
the military, the factory, the asylum, the penitentiary, etc. He summarizes
that development in the 1978 lecture course: Discipline “analyzes and breaks
down … individuals, places, time, movements, actions, and operations. It
breaks them down into components such that they can be seen, on the one
hand, and modified on the other” (2007, 56). Then it classifies those components in relation to its objectives and establishes “optimal sequences or coordinations” to produce a performative ideal. It next designs a program of
training to achieve that ideal in each case. Finally, on the basis of this ideal
and program it identifies those individuals who are unsuitable or incapable.
“Disciplinary normalization consists first of all in positing a model, an optimal model that is constructed in terms of a certain result, and the operation
of disciplinary normalization consists in trying to get people, movements,
and actions to conform to this model, the normal being precisely that which
can conform to this norm, and the abnormal being that which is incapable
of conforming to the norm” (2007, 57).13
Discipline becomes, strictly speaking, normalizing discipline in the eighteenth century when disciplinarians begin to posit a kind of natural developmental force within the bodies they try to train—that is, when discipline
ceases to be understood as an imposition on a body conceived as a machinelike collection of parts and becomes a technique for cultivating the natural
resources of the body conceived as a natural developmental trajectory.
Foucault (1977, 155) locates an early example of this in the military discipline of J. A. de Guibert: If left alone, the disciplinarian imagines, this natural
body would develop in its own direction at its own rate. The job of the normalizing disciplinarian is to harness the energy of that natural developmental
force and redirect it, cultivating and intensifying it to the extent possible.
Thus, the objective correlate and target of normalizing discipline is the
natural, developmental body.
The objective correlate and target of population management, the other
component of biopower that Foucault identifies, is “an absolutely new political personage” in the eighteenth century; “this new personage … is the
population” (2007, 67). “[T]he population is not the simple sum of individuals inhabiting a territory” (2007, 70) but a kind of being unto itself. Like the
developmental body, the population is conceived as a natural phenomenon.
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Its naturalness is evident in three ways. First, the population is dependent
through the course of its existence—and for the particularities of that
course—on a set of variables such as climate, material surroundings, the
circulation of wealth, customs, and means of subsistence. This means that a
sovereign cannot effectively govern a population simply by issuing commands, any more than a disciplinarian, merely by issuing commands, can
train a developmental body. There is an inherent recalcitrance within a population that is a natural, nonvoluntary aspect of its existence. Second, populations encompass disparate groups of people, but there is one thing common
to all people, namely, desire. If desire is allowed free play, in time a general
interest will emerge which can be attributed not to those disparate people
but to the population itself. This general interest is the population’s natural
inclination or tendency; though produced through the pursuits of individuals, it is not artifice. Third, populations evince constancies that cannot be
attributed to individuals and their choices, even collectively. For example, at
the end of the seventeenth century, statistical analysis revealed the astonishing fact that birth rates, death rates, and even rates of suicide in given populations were fairly constant from year to year; populations had natural
regularities that, qua regularities, could not be attributed to the deliberate
decisions of the individuals they comprised. This natural vitality, this “life
course,” of a population could not be ignored if one aimed to govern effectively. It had to be studied and harnessed.
Foucault maintains that the techniques that evolved for governing market
towns—which became modern techniques of security for governing
populations—initially differed radically from techniques of normalizing discipline. The idea was not to train and cultivate the population but to protect
and secure the processes that constituted it from disruption. The dangers
earlier identified as threats to the sovereign through the town (which were
also threats to the ongoing vitality of the town itself) had to be controlled.
The circulation of goods and people—and eventually, in liberal states, information and ideas—had to be as free and unimpeded as possible so that the
town and the various sorts of markets it represented and sustained could
remain healthy. The population (as distinct to although not separable from
the collection of individuals in a territory) was beginning to take on a life of
its own.
As the concept of population emerged—as it was carved, Foucault says,
out of a field of reality through the constant interplay of power and its objects (2007, 79)—statistical techniques evolved for keeping track of those
constituting processes. As a classic example, Foucault mentions the bureaucratic techniques for managing smallpox. By the eighteenth century, it was
widely believed—purely on the basis of empirical evidence absent any theoretical explanation—that introducing a small amount of pus from smallpox
lesions (or lesions of similar poxes) into a healthy person’s body could protect that person from getting sick with smallpox. Public officials studied this
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phenomenon statistically and concluded that indeed inoculation was preventive, so they instituted programs of vaccination, which they then used
statistical methods to monitor. They studied the population as a whole, but
they also studied subpopulations—age groups, professional groups, etc.,
what we would now call different demographic groups. For some groups,
they noted that the risk of infection was higher than it was for others, and
for some populations with the same rates of infection, mortality rates were
higher. There was also a calculable risk of sickening and dying from pox
induced by vaccination or of the vaccination failing to protect against disease
during subsequent exposure. Out of studies such as these came “the idea of
a ‘normal’ morbidity or mortality.” Then, total population morbidity and
mortality were subdivided to yield rates for subpopulations—specific age
groups or certain professional groups or the residents of different locales.
“Thus one will have the normal, overall curve, and different curves considered to be normal” for these subpopulations (2007, 62).
Once a set of norms is established, officials look for ways “to reduce the
most unfavorable, deviant normalities in relation to the normal, general
curve, to bring them in line with this normal, general curve” (2007, 62). So,
for example, if it were discovered that residents of one sector were dying
at a higher rate than the general norm, attention could be focused on that
sector in its differences from others to determine what conditions might
be altered to yield a more favorable outcome. Whatever the chosen means,
the goal would not be to prevent all deaths in that sector but to “normalize”
the sector’s norm, to shift its normal curve. This is the case whether what
is at issue is morbidity, mortality, births, literacy, crime, or commodities
consumption.
This technique of governing bespeaks something entirely different from
the old sovereign concern with holding and expanding territory and exploiting its resources as wealth. Now “we see the emergence of a completely
different problem that is no longer that of fixing and demarcating the territory, but of allowing circulations to take place, of controlling them, sifting
the good and the bad, ensuring that things are always in movement, constantly moving around, continually going from one point to another, but in
such a way that the inherent dangers of this circulation are canceled out”
(2007, 65). Techniques of security are means for governing a free, natural
vitality: a living population. Unlike sovereign power, security fosters rather
than prohibits. Moreover, unlike disciplinary techniques (hygienic regimes,
dividing practices, medical treatments, etc.), which aim at eradication of disease (crime, illiteracy, etc.) through subjugation of individual bodies, techniques of security do not aim to prevent all death (crime, illiteracy, etc.),
only to change the rate at which it occurs. Thus, individual bodies are not
their concern, only bodies in their statistical significance.
Mechanisms and institutions based on these two newly emerging but different types of technique—techniques of security governing populations and

426

Ladelle McWhorter

techniques of disciplinary normalization governing developing bodies—
coalesced in the nineteenth century to form wide networks of new force
relations. Foucault characterizes as these collectively as “biopower” because
of their tendency to cultivate vital capacities—those of the body as well as
those of the population—and redirect and subsume the energy of resistance
rather than simply eliminate opposition through lethal violence. The advent
of biopower, he proclaims, is “nothing less than the entry of life into history,
that is, the entry of phenomena peculiar to the life of the human species into
the order of knowledge and power, into the sphere of political techniques”
(1978, 141–2).14
V. NORMALIZING POPULATIONS: BIOPOWER’S DEPLOYMENT OF
SEXUALITY
As life entered history, techniques of government shifted radically because
what was to be governed was no longer given sets of entities but malleable
trajectories of development—individual, collective, and specific. For nearly a
century, however, techniques aimed at individuals and techniques aimed at
populations developed in parallel but not in unison. They finally came together, Foucault tells us, not first of all in a theoretical discourse but rather “in
the form of concrete arrangements (agencements concrets) that would go to
make up the great technology of power in the nineteenth century: the deployment of sexuality would be one of them, and one of the most important”
(1978, 140). And, as already noted, the two great—and reciprocally reinforcing—innovations in that deployment as the twentieth century drew near were
the “medicine of perversions and the programs of eugenics” (1978, 118).
The eugenics movement came into being at the point where the management of populations took on some of the elements of normalizing
discipline—where, we might say, populations as such became subjects not
only of security techniques but also of disciplinary practices. With the birth
of eugenics, the goal of population management was no longer simply to
facilitate a population’s natural life course and protect its vital processes
from disruption but to increase its capacities through intense cultivation.
It began with the fear that modern medicine and charitable practices were
inhibiting the effects of natural selection. The population (and, depending
on the theorist, this might be the entirety of the human species or a particular nation or a racially defined subgroup such as the “Nordics”) was therefore becoming weaker. In other words, the normal curve for “fitness” in the
current generation was inferior to the normal curve for “fitness” in previous
generations. Steps had to be taken to “normalize” the inferior curve, to make
the current population as “fit” as its normal predecessors. Few eugenicists
advocated killing weak people in pre-pubescence to mimic the action of
natural selection, but they did advocate the next best thing: eliminating them

Governmentality, Biopower, and Genetic Enhancement

427

from the breeding population so that the next generation would not carry
their genes.
Thus described, eugenics is classic population management on Foucault’s
terms, a set of interventions aimed at “normalizing” an undesired “normality.” But of course, eugenics has always been much more than a mere corrective. Eugenicists did not want to bring the normal curve of the least
successful subpopulations in line with the general norm; they wanted to create a new general norm, in part by altering or “enhancing” the norm of the
most successful subpopulations. They wanted to respecify human normality.
The goal was to increase populations’ existing abilities and create new ones
through projects of cultivation and directed development. In other words,
they sought to apply the principles of developmental discipline to select
populations, to subjugate populations as their predecessors and contemporaries had subjugated bodies. Eugenics was not only population management; eugenics was biopower.
In biopolitical processes, normalcy is not to be discovered or restored;
instead, as George Annas observed in regard to enhancement proposals,
“normalcy will be invented” (Annas, 1989, 21). Like their eugenic predecessors, contemporary proponents of genetic enhancement explicitly reject the
existing general standards of human normalcy. According to John Harris,
“enhancements are not plausibly defined relative to normalcy, to normal
species functioning, nor to species-typical functioning …” (Harris, 2007, 36).
University of California-Irvine School of Biological Sciences professor Michael Rose asserts, “You have to reject this concept of normal. You have to
take what evolution does and look at it askance, exploit what it does well,
and provide what it does not provide” (Stock and Campbell, 2000, 93). Like
eugenicists throughout the twentieth century, genetic engineering’s advocates want to change human normalcy itself.
In the early eugenics movement, management of sexuality was seen as the
key to management of all aspects of human development, including the evolution of populations; who could have sex with whom was a fundamental issue,
therefore, which meant that in the pursuit of a better human future a great deal
of sexual oppression was inevitable. Twenty-first-century eugenicists like to
distinguish themselves from that movement by emphasizing their much more
liberal attitude toward individuals’ sexual practices; the fact that new reproductive technologies will enable same-sex couples to produce children genetically related to both partners is often touted as evidence of the radically
nonauthoritarian stance that modern genetic engineers take to sexuality.15 But,
although this may be a welcome change for those whose sexuality has been
most painfully oppressed, it is a technical change only, not a change of principle. Had nonsexual technologies of reproduction existed in the early twentieth century, early eugenicists no doubt would have seized upon them and
might well have abandoned sexually oppressive policies as a result. They
were very capable of changing tactics when new obstacles or opportunities
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presented themselves: witness the rapidity with which most of them let go of
racial classification when use of it became ineffective in achieving their managerial goals, and, after World War II, their willingness to find means to influence reproductive decisions without direct use of the policing mechanisms of
the state. Glayde Whitney’s delight with the possibilities of genetic engineering
technologies for the new millennium no doubt would have been shared by
virtually all of his predecessors. James Watson certainly shares it. “It seems to
me the question we’re going to have to face is, what is going to be the least
unpleasant? Using abortion to get rid of nasty genes from families? Or developing germ-line procedures with which, using Mario Capecchi’s techniques, you
can go in and get rid of a bad gene,” he asks. “And … if we could make better
human beings by knowing how to add genes, why shouldn’t we do it? Who
is telling us not to do it? I mean, it just seems obvious now” (Stock and Campbell, 2000, 79). Watson gleefully predicts that someday, through germ-line
engineering, we will be able to “turn slow learners into whiz kids,” prevent
smokers from getting lung cancer, and make our offspring resistant to HIV
(Abraham, 2002). Thus, perhaps eventually, germ-line engineering could make
eugenic management of sexual conduct unnecessary without sacrificing any of
the eugenic vision.
VI. THE TECHNOLOGY, THE VISION, AND THE QUESTION
Early eugenic technologies were extremely crude by today’s standards—
vasectomy, salpingectomy, life-long incarceration in single-sex facilities for
those deemed “socially inadequate,” threats thereof for those who were “adequate” but likely to stray from the path of heterosexual monogamy, tight
regulation of birth control information, and various strategies for limiting
white middle class women’s life options to marriage and motherhood. Consequently, the results were mixed and, at least when measured by democratic values, at times lamentable. The movement was severely criticized for
its errors and excesses, both technological and social, in pursuit of its goals.
But in a world where biopower predominates, the goals themselves were
never seriously critiqued, much less rejected. “Eugenic principles are part of
our largely unexamined and often unspoken ideology—preconceptions the
society instills in us about who should and should not inhabit the world,”
feminist biologist Ruth Hubbard declares (Hubbard, 1986, 240), which is
why John Harris can plausibly assert that: “Whatever people say, no one, I
believe, actually thinks that there is anything in principle wrong with the
enhancement of human beings” (Harris, 2007, 8). In fact, to question the
basic goals of eugenics is to question the basis of the contemporary industrialized world’s social organization. In a biopolitical society, where cultivation and intensification of vital forces in both individuals and populations are
imperative, eugenics must go forward as technology permits.
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Of course, contra Harris, there are many people who do think there is
something wrong with genetic enhancement. Some people reject the theory
of evolution altogether in favor of the idea that a deity created human beings
exactly as we are now, which makes any attempt to “enhance” our genomes
fundamentally hubristic. Others, like Harvard political theorist Michael
Sandel, say genetic enhancement—which he equates with purchasing upgrades for embryos as one might for a computer—will corrupt important
values; he predicts it will lead to erosion of the ideal of unconditional parental love, diminution in appreciation of athletic and artistic accomplishment,
arrogance rather than humility and gratitude in the face of our own or our
children’s talents, and loss of compassion for those who suffer (Sandel, 2007,
96). In other words, even if enhancing the human genome is not sinful in
itself, the spiritual consequences of success are dire.
Others fear the economic and social consequences, especially the creation
of, as Mitchell and Hooks put it, two distinct and unequal classes: the mentally and physically upgraded versus the rest of us—or, at least, those who
have had the privilege until now of bearing the label of “normal.” As New
York Times columnist David Brooks observed regarding currently available
reproductive technologies, “At this very moment thousands of people are
surfing the Web looking for genetic material so their children will be nothing
like me” (Brooks, 2007). Perhaps those future people, who unlike normal
members of our generation will have good reason to consider themselves
better than their parents, will treat us as poorly as we have treated the
classes of people we have judged to be inferior to ourselves.
Advocates of enhancement rightly point out that introducing new kinds of
difference into our society will not create unjust discrimination; such discrimination is a product of intolerance, not difference. Furthermore, contra
Sandel, our society at present does not place much value on unenhanced
athletic and artistic accomplishment (witness the widespread use of
performance-enhancing drugs in professional sports and the low incomes of
artists of all kinds), nor does it routinely evince gratitude for talents or even
unconditional love for ordinary children. If our spiritual values are threatened with erosion, factors other than genetic engineering are the cause.
But successful genetic enhancement is not what many critics fear; rather,
they dread the price that will be paid for the possibility of success through
the process of discovery. Science and technology advance through experiment, trial and error. When trials and errors involve computer models, fruit
flies, or mice, most people are willing to accept some negative side-effects.
But at some point genetic enhancements techniques will have to be tried—
before they are perfected—on human embryos who may become human
fetuses inside the bodies of human women and then human babies deserving of all the care and bearing all the rights of any other human being.
To understand why these facts create such concern, some knowledge of
current technology is indispensable. Geneticist Mario Cappechi describes the
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most promising method of gene transfer, preimplantation embryonic genetic
modification:
In vitro fertilization using sperm and eggs donated by each set of parents would be
used to generate one-cell embryos. In culture, the embryo would be permitted to
progress to the four-cell stage. The embryo would then be separated into four cells:
three of these cells would be frozen for later use. These are procedures routinely
carried out in IVF clinics. Each of these four cells, frozen or unfrozen, would have
an identical set of genes and would be capable of generating a normal child. The
fourth cell would be allowed to divide in culture until a million cells were generated, taking approximately twenty cell divisions to achieve this number. Different
embryonic cell types would then be present within this cell population, but this
diversity should not affect the procedure. One million cells is an ample population
size to permit the use of technologies, such as gene targeting, to introduce the desired genetic alteration into a subset of these cells. The subset of cells containing the
desired genetic alteration would be isolated from the remaining cell population and
carefully characterized to ensure that the genetic modification was accurate. At this
point, the nucleus of one of the mother’s oocytes would be removed and replaced
with a nucleus from the expanded pool of cells containing the prescribed genetic
modification. In this cytoplasmic environment, the modified nucleus would receive
instructions to commence making an embryo. The cells would be allowed to divide
in culture once or twice, and then the embryo would be surgically transferred to the
mother’s womb to allow pregnancy to continue. A child produced in this way would
contain the genetic modification, introduced in cell culture, in all of his or her cells,
including the germ cells (Stock and Campbell, 2000, 35–7).

This is a technically complex, multistage process. Consequently, within it
there are many opportunities for failure. At present, in vitro fertilization
without any attempt at genetic alteration results in a successful pregnancy in
less than 25% of attempts. Given the odds of losing any individual embryo,
genetic engineers would likely generate several altered embryos—clones, to
ensure that the desired modification was present in all of them—and either
implant multiple embryos initially or freeze some for a potential second attempt. Still, even with several spare clones for repeated attempts, the desired
outcome, a healthy genetically altered human being, would not be assured.
Preimplantation embryonic genetic modification (PGM) has been used to
engineer domesticated food animals in efforts to produce more muscle mass
for consumption. In some experiments, pigs with altered genomes were born,
but the new genes did not actually bring about muscle gain. In a cattle experiment, “[w]hen gene transfer was accomplished, the transgenic calf initially
exhibited muscle hypertrophy, but muscle degeneration and wasting soon
followed. Unable to stand, the debilitated animal was killed” (Gordon, 1999,
2023). According to geneticist French Anderson, 95%–99.9% of all engineered
animal embryos are damaged (Stock and Campbell, 2000, 46). In addition,
“[b]ecause most methods produce animals with different levels of foreign
gene expression, further breeding is required to produce animals with stable
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and properly functioning foreign genes” (Dresser, 2004, 197–8), a process not
likely to be acceptable to parents who pay for and expect genetic modification in their own children or to genetically modified individuals who might
not want to “breed” exclusively with predesignated partners for two or three
generations. “In sum, it is difficult to reconcile the optimism regarding human
PGM with the state of the science. At the same time, the rosy predictions
about PGM support the need for an adequate oversight system to prevent
premature human applications” (Dresser, 2004, 198).16 Clearly, the technology
is not risk free and may generate many unpredictable consequences.
Enhancement enthusiasts like to couch the ethical question entirely in
terms of whether it is right or wrong to genetically enhance people once the
techniques are safe and affordable, not whether it is right or wrong to devote
resources to developing enhancement technology or to risk people’s health
and lives in genetic experiments. But asking whether it is right or wrong to
alter a person’s genome to lengthen her lifespan or increase her intelligence
is, at present, like asking whether it is right or wrong to colonize Mars. We
can imagine such a thing, but it would be technically very difficult, expensive, and hazardous. Should we ever colonize Mars? Should we begin preparations to colonize Mars in the next fiscal year? Ethically speaking, these are
two entirely different questions. The shift to the “ever” question regarding
genetic enhancement is a politically adroit means of masking the concrete
ethical questions about what we—scientists and citizens—might or might
not do with our resources and our bodies right now. And, despite several
years of allegedly ethical debate, those questions remain.
VII. DREAMS, VALUES, AND CHOICES
As we deliberate over these ethical questions, we might reasonably demand
not only honest assessments of risks and accurate accounts of who will benefit
financially at every step but also clear statements of the vision to which we are
being exhorted to dedicate ourselves and our progeny. What are the motive
forces and the managerial telos of this proposed evolutionary project?
In the last century, many eugenic projects were motivated by white supremacy and fears of racial impurity and decline. The dream was that someday the savages and throwbacks would go extinct so that the more intelligent
and evolved races would move forward unencumbered to take intellectual
and technological possession of the globe. Today, replacing the old eugenics
movement’s underlying hope for racial and national purification and material
advance, we hear the recurring themes of individual gain and personal immortality. The world of the future will be ever more fast-paced, complex,
and populated, and it would surely be wrong to deny our children the tools
they need to compete against others successfully—advantages like disease
resistance, back-up organs, intelligence upgrades, memory augmentation,
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switches to turn off the genes that make us age. “Parents are expected to
give their children the best possible opportunities in life,” says biophysicist
and Spectrum Medical Sciences CEO Burke Zimmerman (Stock and Campbell,
2000, 125). In genetic enhancement discourse, post-World War II consumerism and middle class family values always prevail over environmental
concerns, civic-minded self-restraint, and alternative family value systems
wherein building a child’s character might be far more important than purchasing opportunities for his or her future professional or financial success.
Is that what we want?
And of course all these alterations—these vulnerability reductions—will
tend to increase longevity, leading John Harris to call personal immortality
the “Holy Grail” of genetic enhancement (Harris, 2007, 59). James Watson
speculates “that hang-gliding accidents might one day be the leading cause
of death” (Abraham, 2002). And Michael Rose describes, based on his experiments with fruit flies, a future in which Americans of all ages will have
the mortality rate of present-day 10- to 15-year-olds, a rate that would allow
most of us (Americans, at least) to live to be about 1,200 years old and some
of us (those who refuse to hang-glide perhaps) to reach the age of 2,000
(Stock and Campbell, 2000, 49). Perhaps evolution, which of course involves
death, could be managed out of existence altogether someday. Is that what
we want?
Dreams of life everlasting are nothing new. Nor are prescriptions for realizing such dreams; many cultures have promoted practices designed to win
immortality for those who dedicate themselves and their resources to the
pursuit. Immorality through genetic modification is merely biopower’s version of that very ancient dream. Despite the claims of today’s biopolitical
dreamers, however, the question is not whether their fantasies are morally
right or wrong. Rather, the question is a much more immediate and mundane one, that of whether we will in fact comply with attempts to make their
dream reality.
The question is whether we ourselves will or will not embrace those values and visions and all that they entail, whether we will commit resources to
this project rather than to others, whether we will accept the inevitable errors and attendant suffering the process of discovery and implementation
will bring, whether we will prepare for the environmental and social consequences of an affluent population’s intensified capacities and greatly prolonged life. These are questions not just about what we will do but about
who we will be, what sort of lives we will lead and will allow those around
us to lead, and what those lives will mean. These are truly ethical questions,
questions of ethos.
In the midst of these questions, Foucault does not tell us that we should
or should not campaign to ban genetic engineering, that we should or should
not offer our gametes for experimentation, and that we should or should not
clone ourselves. Foucault does not tell us what to do. He will only remind
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us that all dilemmas—in fact, all problematizations—are historical, contingent, structured by power relations and that, therefore, the tools of genealogy can be useful as we seek insight into the options put before us. If
through such analysis we find the values and political valences underlying
the debates over genetic enhancement distasteful or unsettling, we can resist
their imperatives and develop new questions and options for action. For
what Foucault does tell us, again and again, is that the current configuration
of knowledge and power is not inevitable; it can change, and we can change
it. Ethics is a transformative practice of freedom. In fact, creative ethical
process may be far richer with transformative possibility than any genetic
modification that any of us has yet imagined.
NOTES
1. Lee Silver prefaces his book with this declaration: “Throughout, I will explore the ethical arguments that have been raised against the use of this technology. In most instances, I will attribute opposition to conscious or subconscious fears of treading in ‘God’s domain’. Indeed, I will argue that nearly all
of the objections raised by bioethicists and others ring hollow with one exception not often considered.
The power of reprogenetics is so great that if left to the market, those families and groups not able to
afford it could become severely disadvantaged” (Silver, 1998, 13).
2. For background on both Wickliffe Draper and the Pioneer Fund, see Tucker (2002) and
Lombardo (2002). Broadcast journalist Peter Jennings explored the Pioneer Fund and its relationship to
production of the controversial book The Bell Curve in a 1994 airing of “ABC World News Tonight.” A
partial transcript of the show entitled “The Bell Curve and the Pioneer Fund” can be found at http://www.
hardford-hwp.com/archives/45/049.html.
3. John Harris’ attack on Leon Kass in Chapter 8 of his 2007 book is a case in point. I disagree with
Kass’ position myself, but ridicule is not the tactic of a philosopher engaging an interlocutor in genuine
ethical deliberation.
4. Many writers have noted that it is difficult to draw a firm distinction between genetic therapy
and genetic enhancement. One reason is technological; if genetic alterations are performed on embryos,
it is difficult to prevent them from affecting the germ cells and thus being passed to the next generation.
In fact, even in somatic cell therapy in adult men, some tests have indicated that foreign DNA is present
in the seminal fluid (Dresser, 2004, 201). But the main reason is conceptual. Suppose, for example, that
we “treat” mild cases of mental retardation by inserting DNA that would elevate the IQ. Is this therapy or
enhancement? A great deal depends on how we define the words enhancement and normal. Lee Silver
contends, “In every instance, genetic engineering will be used to add something to a child’s genome that
didn’t exist in the genomes of either of its parents. Thus, in every case, genetic engineering will be genetic enhancement” (Silver, 1998, 268).
5. For a transcript of a discussion about eugenics including Crick, Lederberg, and others, see
Wolstenholme (1963, 274–98). For some of Tatum’s remarks, see Tatum (1966). Dobzhansky served on the
board of directors of the American Eugenics Society in the 1950s (Paul, 1998, 142) and wrote an introduction to Frederick Osborn’s (1968) book, where he lamented the bad name that eugenics had acquired. “Yet
eugenics has a sound core,” he stated. “The real problem which mankind will not be able to evade indefinitely is where the evolutionary process is taking man, and where man himself wishes to go. Mr. Osborn
has for several decades been the clear-sighted leader of the eugenical movement in America, who strove
to make the substance of eugenics scientific and its name respectable again” (Osborn, 1968, vi).
6. Among them was well-known physician W. Duncan McKim. In his 1900 book Heredity and Human Progress, McKim proposed death by carbonic acid gas for defectives, including moral defectives. See
McKim (1900, 193). His book received a generally favorable review in the November 1, 1900, edition of
The Nation (pages 349–50).
7. California’s law, under which officials authorized the sterilization of over 30,000 Americans, was
written with Laughlin’s draft as a model, which in turn served as a model for the German law put into
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effect in 1933 under the Nazis. In 1936, Hitler bestowed a medal of honor on Laughlin for his eugenics
work.
8. In 1914, Harry Laughlin addressed the First National Conference on Race Betterment in Battle
Creek, Michigan. The title of his talk was “Calculations on the Working Out of a Proposed Program of
Sterilization,” a text that was in fact the final section of the American Breeders’ Association Report on “The
Best Practical Means of Cutting Off Defective Germ-Plasm in the American Population.” “The proportion
of the population which it is sought to cut off,” Laughlin told his audience, “is the lowest ten percent of
the human stock who are so meagerly endowed by Nature that their perpetuation would constitute a
social menace” (Bruinius, 2006, 212).
9. Paul (1995, 123). In Paul (1998, Chapter 8), he discusses the complexity of Reed’s position on
genetic counseling. He believed those who sought counseling were generally of higher intellectual quality than average, so despite physical disabilities he often encouraged reproduction, even though he realized that in some respects the long-term results would be “dysgenic.” Reed preferred to run the risk of a
physically disabled child rather than the risk of removing eugenically valuable talents and intelligence
from the gene pool. The field of genetic counseling has changed over the years. In 1971, Sarah Lawrence
graduated its first class of students with master’s degrees in genetic counseling; these students were neither geneticists nor physicians. From that point forward, the majority of genetics counselors have been
female and received training in client-centered therapy. See Paul (1998, 147–8) and Paul (2002, 96). However, whether this difference in training really translates into a nondirective approach has been seriously
questioned. See, for example, Patterson and Satz (2002).
10. For a lengthier account of this set of events as well as other information about the twentiethcentury eugenics movement, see McWhorter (2009, Chapters 5 and 6).
11. By 1972, many eugenicists considered abortion of defective fetuses a “therapeutic” option open
to physicians, even though individual women did not yet have the right to obtain an abortion for reasons
of their own, except in the state of New York.
12. This latter statement is quoted in Paul (1995, 125). Paul (1998) quotes a statement Osborn made
in a 1968 interview: “birth control and abortion are turning out to be great eugenic advances of our time.
If they had been advanced for eugenic reasons, it would have retarded or stopped their acceptance”
(142). Apparently, these name changes were deliberate efforts to disguise what Osborn and others saw
as important eugenic work.
13. The abnormal—or the “residue” as Foucault calls it in Psychiatric Power (2006, 53)—is the justification for the extension and creation of new disciplinary institutions and practices. For example, “[s]
ince there are the feeble-minded, that is to say, individuals inaccessible to school discipline, schools for
the feeble-minded will be created, and then schools for those who are inaccessible to schools for the
feeble-minded” (2006, 54).
14. Foucault tells us in The Order of Things that prior to the nineteenth century “life itself did not
exist. All that existed was living beings, which were viewed through a grid of knowledge constituted by
natural history” (Foucault, 1970, 128). Natural historians had studied the physical structure of these beings, their visible “characters.” But at the turn of the nineteenth century, for the scientists who began to
call themselves biologists, the object of study was, simply, life. Life was essentially a temporal process,
unlike the characters so carefully delineated by natural historians. Life was dynamic; life was development. The study of life was the study of change through time expressed as the shifting manifestations of
organisms in their milieus. Without this concept, there could have been neither a developmental body
nor a population. Population became a fundamental category in biological theory in the nineteenth century once it was seen as the solution to the problem of how the milieu acts on the organism. “To think
about the relationships between the milieu and the organism, Lamarck resorted to something like the idea
of the organism being acted on directly and shaped by the milieu. Cuvier resorted to what appear to be
more mythological things—like catastrophes, God’s creative acts, and so on—but which actually organized the field of rationality much more carefully.” But then came Darwin. “Darwin found that population
was the medium between the milieu and the organism, with all the specific effects of population: mutations, eliminations, and so forth” (2007, 78). The concept of population—foundational for nineteenthcentury techniques of government—also gave biology its modern shape. Population and the concept of
life-as-development that undergirds it swept across and restructured dozens of other fields of knowledge
through the nineteenth century. Foucault demonstrates their importance in political economy and philology; we also see them in philosophy, history, anthropology, and psychiatry. Thus, it is no exaggeration
to say that the most fundamental patterns of our thinking today are products of the emergence of
biopower.
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15. For example, Lee Silver’s Remaking Eden opens with a description of two happy lesbians cradling their newborn child. See Silver (1998, 2). The promise that same-sex couples can produce children
genetically related to both of them is ubiquitous in the literature. There are already children who have
genetic material from two women (as well as at least one man). In May 2001, New Jersey’s Institute for
Reproductive Medicine at Barnabas Medical Center acknowledged that at least two children, by then a
year old, had been born as a result of techniques that combined the DNA of three adults. The leader of
the scientific team, Jacques Cohen, denied that these children were genetically altered, asserting that use
of mitochondrial DNA from a second female did not constitute genetic engineering (or, presumably, triple
parentage). But scientists in Australia and elsewhere condemned the work. For a few more details, see
Sams (2001) and Romei (2001).
16. Some moves to create guidelines have already been made. In 2006, the National Institutes of
Health awarded Case Western’s School of Law $773,000 to develop guidelines for the use of human subjects in genetic enhancement research. Their grant application reads in part: “In the absence of guidelines
that explicitly address the special issues of enhancement research, subjects could be exposed to risks that
would be acceptable in the case of therapeutic research but unacceptable in the case of enhancement
research. Moreover, the absence of explicit enhancement research policy is likely to drive this type of
research into the realm of ‘underground’ illicit or off-label use and self-experimentation, which could
cause serious harm to research subjects and to society” (See Maxwell J. Mehlman, 2006, NIH Grant Number 1R01HG003879-01). This NIH-funded project is a sign that human experimentation may well go forward in the near future, the poor record in experiments with domesticated animals and our scant
knowledge of the interactivity of multiple genes in the human genome notwithstanding.
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